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HOMICIDE: DRUNKEN DRIVING AND MURDER
It is the purpose of this paper to present some of the aspects
of the law which deal with criminal convictions of drunken drivers
for murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide, or merely reckless
driving, with the view in mind that a more stringent attitude be
adopted both by the bar and the public m dealing with such of-
fenders.
Murder has been defined as the unlawful killing of another
with malice aforethought.1 This characteristic must be shown to
have existed, either actually or nnpliedly by operation of law, at
the time of the commission of the crime or else the homicide will
be something less than murder. Under one theory of the negligent
murder doctrine the showing of actual knowledge by the defendant
of the extremely dangerous consequences of the act which caused
the death will imply malice. This is often referred to as the "sub-
jective" theory in that the actor is viewed subjectively and a de-
termination made of his actual state of mind.' Under another theory
of this doctrine, propounded by Mr. Justice Holmes, malice may be
implied if it is found that the defendant should have known, under
the circumstances, of the dangerous consequences of his act which
caused death.' Whether or not, in fact, the defendant had know-
ledge is immaterial. All that is required is that a reasonable man
under the circumstances would have known that the act was one
which was likely to result in death or grievous bodily harm.' This
theory is called by some the "objective" theory '
With regard to drunkenness and its relationship to the problem
of "subjectivity" and "objectivity" m determining knowledge of
the dangerous consequences, it is the law today both m England
and the United States, that drunkenness is not an excuse for a
crime.8 Drunkenness may however, in some instances, prevent the
state from making out the offense, specifically in those crimes
'MAY, CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed. 1938) 264.
STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1877) 161.
'Ibid. " (b) Knowledge that the act which causes death
will probably cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to some
person, whether such person is the person actually killed or not,
although such knowledge is accompanied by indifference whether
death or grievous bodily harm is caused or not, or by a wish that it
may not be caused; "4
M ORELAND, A RATIONALE OF CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE (1944) 62.
'HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881) 55-56.
'Ibid.
MORELAND, A RATIONALE OF CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE (1944) 53.
'See 79 A.L.R. 897 et seq. for a list of the cases.
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which require specific intent.' This same reasoning may apply in
negligent murder cases if the subjective view is taken which re-
quires the state to show actual knowledge of the danger."O In such
cases there will be instances, theoretically at least, when the state
will not be able to make out the crime. This is due to the fact that
the drunkenness of the defendant may prevent him from having
actual knowledge of the dangerousness of the act which results in
the death of the deceased. But, it is believed that this problem will
not arise in applying the subjective test to a drunken driver, who,
it may be inferred, will have sufficient control over his mental
faculties to have knowledge of the danger as evidenced by his
ability to do the acts necessary to drive the automobile in a man-
ner that results in death to a human being. Therefore, it is sub-
mitted, there should be no difficulty in convicting the drunken
driver of an automobile of murder under either the subjective or
objective theory
An examination of the decisions regarding homicide committed
by the drunken driver shows that in the large majority of states it is
punished as manslaughter under reckless driving or general man-
slaughter statutes." In some few jurisdictions a new offense has been
created, known as "negligent homicide."' The reason for the creation
of this new offense, instead of applying the law of manslaughter, is
to allow the state to convict reckless drivers, who kill, of homicide
with milder punishment, when they might not be convicted of any
homicide under the manslaughter statute.'
Professor Riesenfeld has stated that the modern tendency to,
mitigate punishment in such cases is probably due to a " popular
feeling that manslaughter is not the right label for cases of homicide
committed through violation of traffic rules. ""1 Professor Turner
goes even further when he describes the purpose of the "reckless
driving" statutes as allowing the jury to say, "We find that the
prisoner has committed manslaughter, but we shall convict him of
dangerous driving instead."'
In spite of this modern trend toward mitigation of punishment
for the drunken driver who commits a killing, islands of rebellion
"Ibid.
"MORELAND, A RATIONALE OF CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE (1944) 37,
n. 138
"Riesenfeld, Negligent Homicide, A Study in Statutory Inter-




'Turner, The Mental Element In Crimes At Common Law
(1938) 6 CAMB. L. J. 31, 52.
"Ibzd.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURN AL
to this "watering down" process may still be found 0 It is with this
vigorous minority that this writer concurs.
By statute17 the State of Minnesota has created the offense of
third-degree murder under which more severe cases of homicide by
a drunken driver have been punished. The justification for such a
statute may be found in the Minnesota case of State v. Weltz.? In
that case the defendant, a plumber and owner of a Cadillac auto-
mobile, spent the afternoon of the crime engaged in several errands
accompanied by a Mrs. Walker, with whom he resided. On his way
home he stopped at a restaurant for a glass of "root beer," leaving
his companion in the car. After about one-half hour, and after his
compaion had resorted to the summomng of a policeman to re-
trieve him, he staggered out of the "root beer parlor" armed with
two glasses filled with the ether-smelling drink of which he had
been imbibing. His companion described him as pale, face drawn,
eyes staring and drowsy When asked what had happened he failed
to reply His companion emptied the contents of the glasses out on
the sidewalk and an argument ensued. Soon thereafter she jumped
out of the car and the defendant drove off "rather fast." The time
was about 7:30 in the evening.
Shortly thereafter, while driving very rapidly down one of the
busy streets of the city he struck the deceased, who was attempting
to cross the street and killed her without stopping to tnveptigate. On
trial, the husband of the victim testified that he heard the roar of a
fast approaching car later estimated to have been traveling about
50 miles per hour. The deceased and her husband and friends were
going to a movie and were about to cross the street when the de-
ceased was struck down by the Cadillac of the defendant.
Shortly afterwards he returned in his car and scattered the
crowd gathered at the scene of the homicide. Immediately, he was
pursued by several policemen and, after a reckless and dangerous
chase, one of the policemen boarded his car and managed to run it
off the road. After a severe clubbing he was brought under control
and placed under arrest. "One [of the policemen] was of the opimon
that he was not so drunk he did not know what he was doing;
another described him as crazy drunk; and the third as looking
crazy "" Even though the defendant was in this "crazy drunk" con-
dition the court found that he had knowledge of what he was doing.
Did not the defendant in tins case exhibit that degree of wanton
disregard and depravity which is evidence of the murderous mind?
IRiesenfeld, Negligent Homicide, A Study in Statutory Inter-
pretation (1936) 25 CALiF. L. REv. 1, 6.
'MINN. STAT. (1941) sec. 619.10.
155 Minn. 143, 193 N. W 42 (1923).
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Would it not, under such circumstances, be a grave miscarriage of
justice to punish him for less than murder ? And yet, obviously, in
most jurisdictions, under the reckless driving statutes, he would be
convicted of manslaughter at the most. It is believed that punish-
ment for manslaughter would not serve as a sufficient deterrent to
others similarly inclined, and consequently a statute enabling con-
victions of murder should be enacted in all jurisdictions to cover
such cases. Of course, where there is no showing of wanton dis-
regard or depravity there should be no conviction of murder, but
that does not mean that the murder statute can be dispensed with.
On the contrary such cases as State v. Weltz point to the necessity
for a statute to enable convictions when the situation calls for it.
Without such a murder statute, even though the situations might
warrant a conviction of murder, no such conviction is likely to be
obtained.
Although in the majority of cases of homcide by a drunken
driver the degree of negligence will not be sufficient to warrant a
conviction of murder, there will be a number of instances where the
punishment of manslaughter will not be severe enough. It may well
be argued that convictions of murder when needed will be obtained
under the general common law rules governing negligent homicide.
But just as manslaughter statutes have been enacted to specifically
apply to reckless drivers so should murder statutes be enacted.
Possibilities of circumvention of the law in its endeavor to mete out
the pumshment commensurate with the crime committed will be
further lessened. In view of the wholesale slaughter on the high-
ways today more stringent punishment and more effective means
for obtaining the same should be provided as an additional
deterrent.'
JAMES C. BROCK
"Wechsler and Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide
(1937) 37 COL. L. REV. 701, 1261 at 1294-98.
